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1.. _embargoed_hardware_issues:2 3Embargoed hardware issues4=========================5 6Scope7-----8 9Hardware issues which result in security problems are a different category10of security bugs than pure software bugs which only affect the Linux11kernel.12 13Hardware issues like Meltdown, Spectre, L1TF etc. must be treated14differently because they usually affect all Operating Systems ("OS") and15therefore need coordination across different OS vendors, distributions,16silicon vendors, hardware integrators, and other parties. For some of the17issues, software mitigations can depend on microcode or firmware updates,18which need further coordination.19 20.. _Contact:21 22Contact23-------24 25The Linux kernel hardware security team is separate from the regular Linux26kernel security team.27 28The team only handles developing fixes for embargoed hardware security29issues. Reports of pure software security bugs in the Linux kernel are not30handled by this team and the reporter will be guided to contact the regular31Linux kernel security team (:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/32<securitybugs>`) instead.33 34The team can be contacted by email at <hardware-security@kernel.org>. This35is a private list of security officers who will help you coordinate a fix36according to our documented process.37 38The list is encrypted and email to the list can be sent by either PGP or39S/MIME encrypted and must be signed with the reporter's PGP key or S/MIME40certificate. The list's PGP key and S/MIME certificate are available from41the following URLs:42 43 - PGP: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/hardware-security.asc44 - S/MIME: https://www.kernel.org/static/files/hardware-security.crt45 46While hardware security issues are often handled by the affected silicon47vendor, we welcome contact from researchers or individuals who have48identified a potential hardware flaw.49 50Hardware security officers51^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^52 53The current team of hardware security officers:54 55 - Linus Torvalds (Linux Foundation Fellow)56 - Greg Kroah-Hartman (Linux Foundation Fellow)57 - Thomas Gleixner (Linux Foundation Fellow)58 59Operation of mailing-lists60^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^61 62The encrypted mailing-lists which are used in our process are hosted on63Linux Foundation's IT infrastructure. By providing this service, members64of Linux Foundation's IT operations personnel technically have the65ability to access the embargoed information, but are obliged to66confidentiality by their employment contract. Linux Foundation IT67personnel are also responsible for operating and managing the rest of68kernel.org's infrastructure.69 70The Linux Foundation's current director of IT Project infrastructure is71Konstantin Ryabitsev.72 73 74Non-disclosure agreements75-------------------------76 77The Linux kernel hardware security team is not a formal body and therefore78unable to enter into any non-disclosure agreements. The kernel community79is aware of the sensitive nature of such issues and offers a Memorandum of80Understanding instead.81 82 83Memorandum of Understanding84---------------------------85 86The Linux kernel community has a deep understanding of the requirement to87keep hardware security issues under embargo for coordination between88different OS vendors, distributors, silicon vendors, and other parties.89 90The Linux kernel community has successfully handled hardware security91issues in the past and has the necessary mechanisms in place to allow92community compliant development under embargo restrictions.93 94The Linux kernel community has a dedicated hardware security team for95initial contact, which oversees the process of handling such issues under96embargo rules.97 98The hardware security team identifies the developers (domain experts) who99will form the initial response team for a particular issue. The initial100response team can bring in further developers (domain experts) to address101the issue in the best technical way.102 103All involved developers pledge to adhere to the embargo rules and to keep104the received information confidential. Violation of the pledge will lead to105immediate exclusion from the current issue and removal from all related106mailing lists. In addition, the hardware security team will also exclude107the offender from future issues. The impact of this consequence is a highly108effective deterrent in our community. In case a violation happens the109hardware security team will inform the involved parties immediately. If you110or anyone else becomes aware of a potential violation, please report it111immediately to the Hardware security officers.112 113 114Process115^^^^^^^116 117Due to the globally distributed nature of Linux kernel development,118face-to-face meetings are almost impossible to address hardware security119issues. Phone conferences are hard to coordinate due to time zones and120other factors and should be only used when absolutely necessary. Encrypted121email has been proven to be the most effective and secure communication122method for these types of issues.123 124Start of Disclosure125"""""""""""""""""""126 127Disclosure starts by emailing the Linux kernel hardware security team per128the Contact section above. This initial contact should contain a129description of the problem and a list of any known affected silicon. If130your organization builds or distributes the affected hardware, we encourage131you to also consider what other hardware could be affected. The disclosing132party is responsible for contacting the affected silicon vendors in a133timely manner.134 135The hardware security team will provide an incident-specific encrypted136mailing list which will be used for initial discussion with the reporter,137further disclosure, and coordination of fixes.138 139The hardware security team will provide the disclosing party a list of140developers (domain experts) who should be informed initially about the141issue after confirming with the developers that they will adhere to this142Memorandum of Understanding and the documented process. These developers143form the initial response team and will be responsible for handling the144issue after initial contact. The hardware security team is supporting the145response team, but is not necessarily involved in the mitigation146development process.147 148While individual developers might be covered by a non-disclosure agreement149via their employer, they cannot enter individual non-disclosure agreements150in their role as Linux kernel developers. They will, however, agree to151adhere to this documented process and the Memorandum of Understanding.152 153The disclosing party should provide a list of contacts for all other154entities who have already been, or should be, informed about the issue.155This serves several purposes:156 157 - The list of disclosed entities allows communication across the158 industry, e.g. other OS vendors, HW vendors, etc.159 160 - The disclosed entities can be contacted to name experts who should161 participate in the mitigation development.162 163 - If an expert who is required to handle an issue is employed by a listed164 entity or member of an listed entity, then the response teams can165 request the disclosure of that expert from that entity. This ensures166 that the expert is also part of the entity's response team.167 168Disclosure169""""""""""170 171The disclosing party provides detailed information to the initial response172team via the specific encrypted mailing-list.173 174From our experience, the technical documentation of these issues is usually175a sufficient starting point, and further technical clarification is best176done via email.177 178Mitigation development179""""""""""""""""""""""180 181The initial response team sets up an encrypted mailing-list or repurposes182an existing one if appropriate.183 184Using a mailing list is close to the normal Linux development process and185has been successfully used to develop mitigations for various hardware186security issues in the past.187 188The mailing list operates in the same way as normal Linux development.189Patches are posted, discussed, and reviewed and if agreed upon, applied to190a non-public git repository which is only accessible to the participating191developers via a secure connection. The repository contains the main192development branch against the mainline kernel and backport branches for193stable kernel versions as necessary.194 195The initial response team will identify further experts from the Linux196kernel developer community as needed. Any involved party can suggest197further experts to be included, each of which will be subject to the same198requirements outlined above.199 200Bringing in experts can happen at any time in the development process and201needs to be handled in a timely manner.202 203If an expert is employed by or a member of an entity on the disclosure list204provided by the disclosing party, then participation will be requested from205the relevant entity.206 207If not, then the disclosing party will be informed about the experts'208participation. The experts are covered by the Memorandum of Understanding209and the disclosing party is requested to acknowledge their participation.210In the case where the disclosing party has a compelling reason to object,211any objection must to be raised within five working days and resolved with212the incident team immediately. If the disclosing party does not react213within five working days this is taken as silent acknowledgment.214 215After the incident team acknowledges or resolves an objection, the expert216is disclosed and brought into the development process.217 218List participants may not communicate about the issue outside of the219private mailing list. List participants may not use any shared resources220(e.g. employer build farms, CI systems, etc) when working on patches.221 222Early access223""""""""""""224 225The patches discussed and developed on the list can neither be distributed226to any individual who is not a member of the response team nor to any other227organization.228 229To allow the affected silicon vendors to work with their internal teams and230industry partners on testing, validation, and logistics, the following231exception is provided:232 233 Designated representatives of the affected silicon vendors are234 allowed to hand over the patches at any time to the silicon235 vendor’s response team. The representative must notify the kernel236 response team about the handover. The affected silicon vendor must237 have and maintain their own documented security process for any238 patches shared with their response team that is consistent with239 this policy.240 241 The silicon vendor’s response team can distribute these patches to242 their industry partners and to their internal teams under the243 silicon vendor’s documented security process. Feedback from the244 industry partners goes back to the silicon vendor and is245 communicated by the silicon vendor to the kernel response team.246 247 The handover to the silicon vendor’s response team removes any248 responsibility or liability from the kernel response team regarding249 premature disclosure, which happens due to the involvement of the250 silicon vendor’s internal teams or industry partners. The silicon251 vendor guarantees this release of liability by agreeing to this252 process.253 254Coordinated release255"""""""""""""""""""256 257The involved parties will negotiate the date and time when the embargo258ends. At that point, the prepared mitigations are published into the259relevant kernel trees. There is no pre-notification process: the260mitigations are published in public and available to everyone at the same261time.262 263While we understand that hardware security issues need coordinated embargo264time, the embargo time should be constrained to the minimum time that is265required for all involved parties to develop, test, and prepare their266mitigations. Extending embargo time artificially to meet conference talk267dates or other non-technical reasons creates more work and burden for the268involved developers and response teams as the patches need to be kept up to269date in order to follow the ongoing upstream kernel development, which270might create conflicting changes.271 272CVE assignment273""""""""""""""274 275Neither the hardware security team nor the initial response team assign276CVEs, nor are CVEs required for the development process. If CVEs are277provided by the disclosing party they can be used for documentation278purposes.279 280Process ambassadors281-------------------282 283For assistance with this process we have established ambassadors in various284organizations, who can answer questions about or provide guidance on the285reporting process and further handling. Ambassadors are not involved in the286disclosure of a particular issue, unless requested by a response team or by287an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:288 289 ============= ========================================================290 AMD Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>291 Ampere Darren Hart <darren@os.amperecomputing.com>292 ARM Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>293 IBM Power Michael Ellerman <ellerman@au.ibm.com>294 IBM Z Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>295 Intel Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>296 Qualcomm Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>297 RISC-V Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>298 Samsung Javier González <javier.gonz@samsung.com>299 300 Microsoft James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>301 Xen Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>302 303 Canonical John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>304 Debian Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>305 Oracle Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>306 Red Hat Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>307 SUSE Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>308 309 Google Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>310 311 LLVM Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>312 ============= ========================================================313 314If you want your organization to be added to the ambassadors list, please315contact the hardware security team. The nominated ambassador has to316understand and support our process fully and is ideally well-connected in317the Linux kernel community.318 319Encrypted mailing-lists320-----------------------321 322We use encrypted mailing lists for communication. The operating principle323of these lists is that email sent to the list is encrypted either with the324list's PGP key or with the list's S/MIME certificate. The mailing list325software decrypts the email and re-encrypts it individually for each326subscriber with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME certificate. Details327about the mailing list software and the setup that is used to ensure the328security of the lists and protection of the data can be found here:329https://korg.wiki.kernel.org/userdoc/remail.330 331List keys332^^^^^^^^^333 334For initial contact see the :ref:`Contact` section above. For incident335specific mailing lists, the key and S/MIME certificate are conveyed to the336subscribers by email sent from the specific list.337 338Subscription to incident-specific lists339^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^340 341Subscription to incident-specific lists is handled by the response teams.342Disclosed parties who want to participate in the communication send a list343of potential experts to the response team so the response team can validate344subscription requests.345 346Each subscriber needs to send a subscription request to the response team347by email. The email must be signed with the subscriber's PGP key or S/MIME348certificate. If a PGP key is used, it must be available from a public key349server and is ideally connected to the Linux kernel's PGP web of trust. See350also: https://www.kernel.org/signature.html.351 352The response team verifies that the subscriber request is valid and adds353the subscriber to the list. After subscription the subscriber will receive354email from the mailing-list which is signed either with the list's PGP key355or the list's S/MIME certificate. The subscriber's email client can extract356the PGP key or the S/MIME certificate from the signature so the subscriber357can send encrypted email to the list.358 359