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1===================2Speculation Control3===================4 5Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in6fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across7privilege domains.8 9The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various10forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some11can be supplied on the kernel command line.12 13There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can14be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled15environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via16:manpage:`prctl(2)`.17 18There are two prctl options which are related to this:19 20 * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL21 22 * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL23 24PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL25-----------------------26 27PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature28which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with29the following meaning:30 31==== ====================== ==================================================32Bit  Define                 Description33==== ====================== ==================================================340    PR_SPEC_PRCTL          Mitigation can be controlled per task by35                            PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.361    PR_SPEC_ENABLE         The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is37                            disabled.382    PR_SPEC_DISABLE        The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is39                            enabled.403    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE  Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A41                            subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.424    PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but the state will be43                            cleared on :manpage:`execve(2)`.44==== ====================== ==================================================45 46If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.47 48If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is49available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation50misfeature will fail.51 52.. _set_spec_ctrl:53 54PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL55-----------------------56 57PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which58is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand59in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or60PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.61 62Common error codes63------------------64======= =================================================================65Value   Meaning66======= =================================================================67EINVAL  The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused68        prctl(2) arguments are not 0.69 70ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.71======= =================================================================72 73PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes74-----------------------------------75======= =================================================================76Value   Meaning77======= =================================================================780       Success79 80ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor81        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.82 83ENXIO   Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.84        See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.85 86EPERM   Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller87        tried to enable it again.88======= =================================================================89 90Speculation misfeature controls91-------------------------------92- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass93 94  Invocations:95   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);96   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);97   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);98   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);99   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC, 0, 0);100 101- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes102                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)103 104  Invocations:105   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);106   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);107   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);108   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);109 110- PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH: Flush L1D Cache on context switch out of the task111                        (works only when tasks run on non SMT cores)112 113  Invocations:114   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, 0, 0, 0);115   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);116   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);117