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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later2/* X.509 certificate parser3 *4 * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.5 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)6 */7 8#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt9#include <linux/kernel.h>10#include <linux/export.h>11#include <linux/slab.h>12#include <linux/err.h>13#include <linux/oid_registry.h>14#include <crypto/public_key.h>15#include "x509_parser.h"16#include "x509.asn1.h"17#include "x509_akid.asn1.h"18 19struct x509_parse_context {20 struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */21 unsigned long data; /* Start of data */22 const void *key; /* Key data */23 size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */24 const void *params; /* Key parameters */25 size_t params_size; /* Size of key parameters */26 enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */27 enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */28 enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */29 u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */30 u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */31 u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */32 u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */33 u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */34 u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */35 unsigned raw_akid_size;36 const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */37 const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */38 unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;39};40 41/*42 * Free an X.509 certificate43 */44void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)45{46 if (cert) {47 public_key_free(cert->pub);48 public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);49 kfree(cert->issuer);50 kfree(cert->subject);51 kfree(cert->id);52 kfree(cert->skid);53 kfree(cert);54 }55}56EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);57 58/*59 * Parse an X.509 certificate60 */61struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)62{63 struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate);64 struct x509_parse_context *ctx __free(kfree) = NULL;65 struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;66 long ret;67 68 cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);69 if (!cert)70 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);71 cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);72 if (!cert->pub)73 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);74 cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);75 if (!cert->sig)76 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);77 ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);78 if (!ctx)79 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);80 81 ctx->cert = cert;82 ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;83 84 /* Attempt to decode the certificate */85 ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_decoder, ctx, data, datalen);86 if (ret < 0)87 return ERR_PTR(ret);88 89 /* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */90 if (ctx->raw_akid) {91 pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",92 ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);93 ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,94 ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);95 if (ret < 0) {96 pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");97 return ERR_PTR(ret);98 }99 }100 101 cert->pub->key = kmemdup(ctx->key, ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL);102 if (!cert->pub->key)103 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);104 105 cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;106 107 cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, GFP_KERNEL);108 if (!cert->pub->params)109 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);110 111 cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->params_size;112 cert->pub->algo = ctx->key_algo;113 114 /* Grab the signature bits */115 ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);116 if (ret < 0)117 return ERR_PTR(ret);118 119 /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */120 kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,121 cert->raw_serial_size,122 cert->raw_issuer,123 cert->raw_issuer_size);124 if (IS_ERR(kid))125 return ERR_CAST(kid);126 cert->id = kid;127 128 /* Detect self-signed certificates */129 ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);130 if (ret < 0)131 return ERR_PTR(ret);132 133 return_ptr(cert);134}135EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse);136 137/*138 * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how139 * to interpret it.140 */141int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,142 unsigned char tag,143 const void *value, size_t vlen)144{145 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;146 147 ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);148 if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {149 char buffer[50];150 sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));151 pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",152 (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);153 }154 return 0;155}156 157/*158 * Save the position of the TBS data so that we can check the signature over it159 * later.160 */161int x509_note_tbs_certificate(void *context, size_t hdrlen,162 unsigned char tag,163 const void *value, size_t vlen)164{165 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;166 167 pr_debug("x509_note_tbs_certificate(,%zu,%02x,%ld,%zu)!\n",168 hdrlen, tag, (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, vlen);169 170 ctx->cert->tbs = value - hdrlen;171 ctx->cert->tbs_size = vlen + hdrlen;172 return 0;173}174 175/*176 * Record the algorithm that was used to sign this certificate.177 */178int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,179 const void *value, size_t vlen)180{181 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;182 183 pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);184 185 switch (ctx->last_oid) {186 default:187 return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */188 189 case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:190 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";191 goto rsa_pkcs1;192 193 case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:194 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";195 goto rsa_pkcs1;196 197 case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:198 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";199 goto rsa_pkcs1;200 201 case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:202 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";203 goto rsa_pkcs1;204 205 case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:206 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";207 goto rsa_pkcs1;208 209 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1:210 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";211 goto ecdsa;212 213 case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_256:214 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";215 goto rsa_pkcs1;216 217 case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_384:218 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-384";219 goto rsa_pkcs1;220 221 case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_512:222 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-512";223 goto rsa_pkcs1;224 225 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224:226 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";227 goto ecdsa;228 229 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha256:230 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";231 goto ecdsa;232 233 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha384:234 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";235 goto ecdsa;236 237 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha512:238 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";239 goto ecdsa;240 241 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_256:242 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";243 goto ecdsa;244 245 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_384:246 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-384";247 goto ecdsa;248 249 case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_512:250 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-512";251 goto ecdsa;252 253 case OID_gost2012Signature256:254 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256";255 goto ecrdsa;256 257 case OID_gost2012Signature512:258 ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";259 goto ecrdsa;260 }261 262rsa_pkcs1:263 ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";264 ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";265 ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;266 return 0;267ecrdsa:268 ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";269 ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";270 ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;271 return 0;272ecdsa:273 ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";274 ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962";275 ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;276 return 0;277}278 279/*280 * Note the whereabouts and type of the signature.281 */282int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,283 unsigned char tag,284 const void *value, size_t vlen)285{286 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;287 288 pr_debug("Signature: alg=%u, size=%zu\n", ctx->last_oid, vlen);289 290 /*291 * In X.509 certificates, the signature's algorithm is stored in two292 * places: inside the TBSCertificate (the data that is signed), and293 * alongside the signature. These *must* match.294 */295 if (ctx->last_oid != ctx->sig_algo) {296 pr_warn("signatureAlgorithm (%u) differs from tbsCertificate.signature (%u)\n",297 ctx->last_oid, ctx->sig_algo);298 return -EINVAL;299 }300 301 if (strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0 ||302 strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0 ||303 strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0) {304 /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */305 if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)306 return -EBADMSG;307 308 value++;309 vlen--;310 }311 312 ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;313 ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;314 return 0;315}316 317/*318 * Note the certificate serial number319 */320int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,321 unsigned char tag,322 const void *value, size_t vlen)323{324 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;325 ctx->cert->raw_serial = value;326 ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen;327 return 0;328}329 330/*331 * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name.332 */333int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen,334 unsigned char tag,335 const void *value, size_t vlen)336{337 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;338 339 switch (ctx->last_oid) {340 case OID_commonName:341 ctx->cn_size = vlen;342 ctx->cn_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;343 break;344 case OID_organizationName:345 ctx->o_size = vlen;346 ctx->o_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;347 break;348 case OID_email_address:349 ctx->email_size = vlen;350 ctx->email_offset = (unsigned long)value - ctx->data;351 break;352 default:353 break;354 }355 356 return 0;357}358 359/*360 * Fabricate and save the issuer and subject names361 */362static int x509_fabricate_name(struct x509_parse_context *ctx, size_t hdrlen,363 unsigned char tag,364 char **_name, size_t vlen)365{366 const void *name, *data = (const void *)ctx->data;367 size_t namesize;368 char *buffer;369 370 if (*_name)371 return -EINVAL;372 373 /* Empty name string if no material */374 if (!ctx->cn_size && !ctx->o_size && !ctx->email_size) {375 buffer = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);376 if (!buffer)377 return -ENOMEM;378 buffer[0] = 0;379 goto done;380 }381 382 if (ctx->cn_size && ctx->o_size) {383 /* Consider combining O and CN, but use only the CN if it is384 * prefixed by the O, or a significant portion thereof.385 */386 namesize = ctx->cn_size;387 name = data + ctx->cn_offset;388 if (ctx->cn_size >= ctx->o_size &&389 memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset,390 ctx->o_size) == 0)391 goto single_component;392 if (ctx->cn_size >= 7 &&393 ctx->o_size >= 7 &&394 memcmp(data + ctx->cn_offset, data + ctx->o_offset, 7) == 0)395 goto single_component;396 397 buffer = kmalloc(ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size + 1,398 GFP_KERNEL);399 if (!buffer)400 return -ENOMEM;401 402 memcpy(buffer,403 data + ctx->o_offset, ctx->o_size);404 buffer[ctx->o_size + 0] = ':';405 buffer[ctx->o_size + 1] = ' ';406 memcpy(buffer + ctx->o_size + 2,407 data + ctx->cn_offset, ctx->cn_size);408 buffer[ctx->o_size + 2 + ctx->cn_size] = 0;409 goto done;410 411 } else if (ctx->cn_size) {412 namesize = ctx->cn_size;413 name = data + ctx->cn_offset;414 } else if (ctx->o_size) {415 namesize = ctx->o_size;416 name = data + ctx->o_offset;417 } else {418 namesize = ctx->email_size;419 name = data + ctx->email_offset;420 }421 422single_component:423 buffer = kmalloc(namesize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);424 if (!buffer)425 return -ENOMEM;426 memcpy(buffer, name, namesize);427 buffer[namesize] = 0;428 429done:430 *_name = buffer;431 ctx->cn_size = 0;432 ctx->o_size = 0;433 ctx->email_size = 0;434 return 0;435}436 437int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,438 unsigned char tag,439 const void *value, size_t vlen)440{441 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;442 struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;443 444 ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value;445 ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen;446 447 if (!ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2]) {448 kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);449 if (IS_ERR(kid))450 return PTR_ERR(kid);451 ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[2] = kid;452 }453 454 return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen);455}456 457int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,458 unsigned char tag,459 const void *value, size_t vlen)460{461 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;462 ctx->cert->raw_subject = value;463 ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen;464 return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen);465}466 467/*468 * Extract the parameters for the public key469 */470int x509_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,471 unsigned char tag,472 const void *value, size_t vlen)473{474 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;475 476 /*477 * AlgorithmIdentifier is used three times in the x509, we should skip478 * first and ignore third, using second one which is after subject and479 * before subjectPublicKey.480 */481 if (!ctx->cert->raw_subject || ctx->key)482 return 0;483 ctx->params = value - hdrlen;484 ctx->params_size = vlen + hdrlen;485 return 0;486}487 488/*489 * Extract the data for the public key algorithm490 */491int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,492 unsigned char tag,493 const void *value, size_t vlen)494{495 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;496 enum OID oid;497 498 ctx->key_algo = ctx->last_oid;499 switch (ctx->last_oid) {500 case OID_rsaEncryption:501 ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";502 break;503 case OID_gost2012PKey256:504 case OID_gost2012PKey512:505 ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";506 break;507 case OID_id_ecPublicKey:508 if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0)509 return -EBADMSG;510 511 switch (oid) {512 case OID_id_prime192v1:513 ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p192";514 break;515 case OID_id_prime256v1:516 ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p256";517 break;518 case OID_id_ansip384r1:519 ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p384";520 break;521 case OID_id_ansip521r1:522 ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecdsa-nist-p521";523 break;524 default:525 return -ENOPKG;526 }527 break;528 default:529 return -ENOPKG;530 }531 532 /* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */533 if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)534 return -EBADMSG;535 ctx->key = value + 1;536 ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;537 return 0;538}539 540/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */541#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)542 543/*544 * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.545 */546int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,547 unsigned char tag,548 const void *value, size_t vlen)549{550 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;551 struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;552 const unsigned char *v = value;553 554 pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);555 556 if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {557 /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */558 if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)559 return -EBADMSG;560 if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)561 return -EBADMSG;562 v += 2;563 vlen -= 2;564 565 ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;566 ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;567 kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);568 if (IS_ERR(kid))569 return PTR_ERR(kid);570 ctx->cert->skid = kid;571 pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);572 return 0;573 }574 575 if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {576 /*577 * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string578 * v[1] is the encoding size579 * (Expect either 0x02 or 0x03, making it 1 or 2 bytes)580 * v[2] is the number of unused bits in the bit string581 * (If >= 3 keyCertSign is missing when v[1] = 0x02)582 * v[3] and possibly v[4] contain the bit string583 *584 * From RFC 5280 4.2.1.3:585 * 0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string586 * 0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string587 */588 if (v[0] != ASN1_BTS)589 return -EBADMSG;590 if (vlen < 4)591 return -EBADMSG;592 if (v[2] >= 8)593 return -EBADMSG;594 if (v[3] & 0x80)595 ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG;596 if (v[1] == 0x02 && v[2] <= 2 && (v[3] & 0x04))597 ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;598 else if (vlen > 4 && v[1] == 0x03 && (v[3] & 0x04))599 ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN;600 return 0;601 }602 603 if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {604 /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */605 ctx->raw_akid = v;606 ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;607 return 0;608 }609 610 if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {611 /*612 * Get hold of the basicConstraints613 * v[1] is the encoding size614 * (Expect 0x2 or greater, making it 1 or more bytes)615 * v[2] is the encoding type616 * (Expect an ASN1_BOOL for the CA)617 * v[3] is the contents of the ASN1_BOOL618 * (Expect 1 if the CA is TRUE)619 * vlen should match the entire extension size620 */621 if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))622 return -EBADMSG;623 if (vlen < 2)624 return -EBADMSG;625 if (v[1] != vlen - 2)626 return -EBADMSG;627 if (vlen >= 4 && v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)628 ctx->cert->pub->key_eflags |= 1 << KEY_EFLAG_CA;629 return 0;630 }631 632 return 0;633}634 635/**636 * x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object637 * @_t: The time to fill in638 * @hdrlen: The length of the object header639 * @tag: The object tag640 * @value: The object value641 * @vlen: The size of the object value642 *643 * Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the644 * kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:645 *646 * [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]647 * CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity648 * dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in649 * 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming650 * applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in651 * either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.652 */653int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,654 unsigned char tag,655 const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)656{657 static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30,658 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };659 const unsigned char *p = value;660 unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;661 662#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })663#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })664 665 if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {666 /* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */667 if (vlen != 13)668 goto unsupported_time;669 year = DD2bin(p);670 if (year >= 50)671 year += 1900;672 else673 year += 2000;674 } else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {675 /* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */676 if (vlen != 15)677 goto unsupported_time;678 year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);679 if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)680 goto invalid_time;681 } else {682 goto unsupported_time;683 }684 685 mon = DD2bin(p);686 day = DD2bin(p);687 hour = DD2bin(p);688 min = DD2bin(p);689 sec = DD2bin(p);690 691 if (*p != 'Z')692 goto unsupported_time;693 694 if (year < 1970 ||695 mon < 1 || mon > 12)696 goto invalid_time;697 698 mon_len = month_lengths[mon - 1];699 if (mon == 2) {700 if (year % 4 == 0) {701 mon_len = 29;702 if (year % 100 == 0) {703 mon_len = 28;704 if (year % 400 == 0)705 mon_len = 29;706 }707 }708 }709 710 if (day < 1 || day > mon_len ||711 hour > 24 || /* ISO 8601 permits 24:00:00 as midnight tomorrow */712 min > 59 ||713 sec > 60) /* ISO 8601 permits leap seconds [X.680 46.3] */714 goto invalid_time;715 716 *_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);717 return 0;718 719unsupported_time:720 pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",721 tag, (int)vlen, value);722 return -EBADMSG;723invalid_time:724 pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",725 tag, (int)vlen, value);726 return -EBADMSG;727}728EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);729 730int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,731 unsigned char tag,732 const void *value, size_t vlen)733{734 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;735 return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);736}737 738int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,739 unsigned char tag,740 const void *value, size_t vlen)741{742 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;743 return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);744}745 746/*747 * Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier748 */749int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,750 unsigned char tag,751 const void *value, size_t vlen)752{753 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;754 struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;755 756 pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);757 758 if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])759 return 0;760 761 kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);762 if (IS_ERR(kid))763 return PTR_ERR(kid);764 pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);765 ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;766 return 0;767}768 769/*770 * Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier771 */772int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,773 unsigned char tag,774 const void *value, size_t vlen)775{776 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;777 778 pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);779 780 ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;781 ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;782 return 0;783}784 785/*786 * Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier787 */788int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,789 unsigned char tag,790 const void *value, size_t vlen)791{792 struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;793 struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;794 795 pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);796 797 if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])798 return 0;799 800 kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,801 vlen,802 ctx->akid_raw_issuer,803 ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);804 if (IS_ERR(kid))805 return PTR_ERR(kid);806 807 pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);808 ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;809 return 0;810}811